MJL Bangladesh valuation report: fair value BDT 72–87.1 (Oct 2026)

Fair value range BDT 72–87 (base 79): Mobil lubricants and tankers carry the value, while debt-funded LPG earns almost nothing

MJL Bangladesh PLC (DSE: MJLBD) sells Mobil-brand lubricants in Bangladesh under its licence from ExxonMobil, runs oil tankers, and owns 62.5% of Omera Petroleum, which it describes as the country's largest LPG company with about 22% of the market [1 p.142] [1 p.271]. The East Coast Group controls it through EC Securities (52.06%), and the state's Jamuna Oil holds 19.45% [1 p.214]. In FY2025 (year to June) group net revenue was BDT 41.8bn: LPG and cylinders BDT 31.2bn, lubricants BDT 8.2bn and tanker freight BDT 2.4bn [1 p.248]. Revenue mix and profit mix are very different. LPG is three-quarters of revenue, but Omera Petroleum earned only BDT 30mn after tax on BDT 31.1bn of sales, because BDT 1.93bn of interest and a turnover-based minimum tax absorbed its BDT 2.85bn gross profit [1 p.276]. The listed parent, lubricants plus tankers, earned BDT 3.50bn [1 p.227].

Reported EPS flatters the trend. FY2025 EPS of BDT 11.36 included a BDT 1.65bn gain on the sale of the Aframax tanker Omera Legacy [1 p.250]; without it, at an assumed 21.4% tax, core EPS was about BDT 7.27. On 28-Oct-2026 the company announced FY2026 EPS of BDT 11.04, NAV of BDT 59.90 and a 50% cash dividend [6]. The nine months to March 2026 had produced only BDT 5.91 [5 p.3], so the fourth quarter alone earned BDT 5.13. A fourth quarter at the third-quarter run-rate explains BDT 2.05 of that; the other BDT 3.08 (BDT 974mn) is not yet explained by any filing. It is booked profit and stays in the FY2026 book, but whether it recurs is unknown (an asset gain, a tax true-up or acquisition accounting would not; a better LPG or freight quarter would), so we show it as a separate residual line and do not project it until the audited annual is published [10].

The group is also more indebted than it was. Borrowings rose from BDT 13.6bn in June 2023 to BDT 21.6bn in June 2025 and BDT 31.6bn in March 2026, as MJL paid for two more tankers (Omera Liberty and Omera Pride, BDT 8.4bn in work-in-progress) with a BDT 7.4bn BRAC Bank term loan, and Omera Petroleum bought Premier LP Gas (Totalgaz) [5 p.2] [5 p.19] [5 p.27]. Our model has FY2027F EPS of BDT 7.52, below FY2026, because a full year of interest on that debt (about BDT 3.5bn) arrives before the new ships earn a full year; EPS then recovers to BDT 10.11 in FY2028F and 14.32 in FY2031F [10].

We put fair value at BDT 72–87, base BDT 79.3, probability-weighted 79.4, from a discounted cash flow (50%), a justified forward P/E (30%) and a justified price-to-book (20%) at a 14.7% cost of equity and a 11.3% WACC [10]. The price of BDT 90.8 (29-Oct-2026) [7] sits above the range, 15% above the base. The latest period used is the nine months to 31-Mar-2026 plus the DSE-announced FY2026 figures; the audited FY2026 statements have not been filed, and the model will be updated when they are.

Three businesses under one listed parent: LPG is 72% of FY2026E revenue, lubricants and tankers most of the profit

MJL Bangladesh began in 1998 as a joint venture between the East Coast Group, Jamuna Oil and Mobil to blend and sell Mobil lubricants [9]. It blends locally at its lube oil blending plant (LOBP) in Chattogram and imports finished Mobil products; base oil and additives come mainly from ExxonMobil, and the packaging is specified by ExxonMobil [1 p.255]. It pays a blending fee to ExxonMobil (BDT 178.4mn in FY2025, inside cost of sales) [1 p.250], and keeps a cheaper Omera lubricant brand for the mid and low end of the market [1 p.50]. The Mobil licence is the core asset: it gives MJL a global brand, technical specifications and product supply that local blenders cannot copy.

Oil tankers are the second business. MJL sold the Aframax Omera Legacy in FY2025 and bought the second-hand Omera Galaxy, losing a few voyages in the changeover [1 p.50]; tanker revenue fell to BDT 2.38bn from 2.61bn [1 p.248]. In FY2026 it committed to two more ships: capital work-in-progress at the parent rose to BDT 10.98bn at March 2026, of which BDT 7.43bn for Omera Liberty and BDT 0.95bn for Omera Pride, funded by a BDT 7.45bn BRAC Bank term loan [5 p.19] [5 p.27]. The company has not published the vessels' tonnage or charter terms in the filings we hold; our revenue assumption for them is labelled in the model.

LPG is the third and largest by revenue. Omera Petroleum Limited (OPL), set up in 2015 with BB Energy (25%) and the Dutch development bank FMO (12.5%), imports LPG through its Mongla terminal and bottles it at Mirsharai, Ghorashal and Bogura, with four LPG barges and 51 road tankers [1 p.270] [1 p.271]. It can handle about 500,000 tonnes a year and sells through over 50,000 retailers [1 p.143]. Omera Cylinders (OCL) makes the cylinders, mostly for OPL. In September 2025 OPL agreed to buy 99.9955% of Premier LP Gas (Totalgaz Bangladesh) for BDT 2.27bn, with 1.6 million cylinders and a Chattogram base; the combined share is put at about 27% by the company [1 p.45] [1 p.143] [6]. The March 2026 balance sheet shows goodwill of BDT 540mn and an investment in Premier LP Gas, so the deal has closed [5 p.2] [5 p.19]. A fuel-station or bitumen line is not reported as a segment in the filings we read: the group's segments are lubricants (manufacturing and trading units), the oil tanker unit, LPG and cylinders [1 p.248].

Ownership matters for value in two ways. East Coast's control decides the payout and the group's appetite for debt-funded expansion; related-party dealings run both ways, including inter-company loans to Omera Fuels and MJL (Singapore) of BDT 1.17bn at March 2026 [5 p.22] and a jointly bought commercial property in Gulshan-1 (BDT 2.14bn, split 50:50 with EC Holdings) [6]. Jamuna Oil, through BPC, gives the government an indirect stake of about 11.7% and a board seat; Jamuna also sells MJL products through its own network [1 p.255]. Jamuna's own report values its 61.6mn MJLBD shares at market [9].

Mobil lubricants earn a 32% gross margin; a 10% rise in base oil x taka costs about BDT 0.31 of FY2027F EPS if a quarter of it sticks

Bangladesh's lubricant market is supplied by imported base oil blended locally or by finished imports, and it is led by multinational brands working through local blenders and distributors: Mobil through MJL, Shell through Eastern Lubricants for power plants, and others. Demand comes from the vehicle fleet (engine oils), power plants (gas-engine oils), ships and industry. The market had a hard FY2025: the CEO puts the fall in industry volume at nearly 25%, as inflation, floods, lay-offs and political transition squeezed mobility and factory output and buyers down-traded or deferred purchases [1 p.49]. MJL limited its own volume decline to 12%, which implies it gained share, and it took one price increase during the year [1 p.50]. These are the company's own figures; no independent market-share series exists for Bangladeshi lubricants, so we treat share as a labelled estimate.

Lubricant revenue was BDT 8.25bn in FY2025, down 0.8% from 8.32bn, with volume down and price up [1 p.248]. In the nine months to March 2026 it was BDT 6.17bn, down 1.3%: locally blended products rose 3.7% to BDT 3.52bn while imported Mobil products fell 8.2% to BDT 2.60bn [5 p.31]. Gross margin held: 32.1% in FY2025 and 31.9% in the nine months, with the blending unit at 37.9% and the trading unit at 23.7% [1 p.227] [5 p.6]. We forecast lubricant volume +3% in FY2027F and +4% a year after that, as vehicle use and industry recover, plus 4% a year of price, so lubricant revenue grows from BDT 8.53bn in FY2026E to 12.50bn in FY2031F; gross margin is held at the nine-month 31.9% [10].

The margin's enemy is the landed cost of base oil, which is priced in US dollars and paid in taka. Material is roughly 54% of lubricant revenue in our model (cost of sales is about 68% of revenue, and we take imported base oil and additives as about 80% of that, a labelled estimate). Prices follow costs with about a quarter's lag, so in a year roughly three-quarters of a cost shock is passed on. On that basis, base oil up 10% with the taka 5% weaker would take about BDT 0.48 off FY2027F EPS of BDT 7.52; the full grid is below. Our risk test of a 3pp margin loss in FY2027F and 1.5pp in FY2028F, a larger and stickier shock, cuts FY2027F EPS to BDT 6.83 and fair value to BDT 79. The taka has been more stable since the move to a market-based rate in 2025, which lowers this risk compared with FY2023–FY2024.

The ExxonMobil relationship is the biggest single dependency. MJL buys base oil and additives from ExxonMobil-approved sources, uses ExxonMobil packaging specifications, pays a blending fee and markets under the Mobil brand [1 p.255] [1 p.250]. The filings do not disclose the licence's term or renewal date, which is a gap. If the terms worsened, or the brand moved to another distributor, lubricant volume could fall sharply; our risk test of a 30% drop from FY2028F cuts fair value to BDT 59. The relationship has lasted since 1998, which is the main reason we treat this as a tail risk rather than a base case.

Two new tankers lift freight revenue from BDT 3.2bn (FY2026E) to 5.8bn by FY2028F in our base case

The tanker unit earns voyage freight and demurrage; it reported 44.1% gross margin in FY2025 and 53.0% in the nine months to March 2026 [1 p.227] [5 p.6]. Its revenue in the nine months, BDT 2.29bn, already exceeds most of FY2025's BDT 2.38bn because Omera Galaxy sailed all year [5 p.31]. Tanker freight is a global market: rates rose after the Red Sea disruptions and the sanctions on Russian oil lengthened voyages, and they can fall as quickly. We therefore use a freight factor that moves ±15% in the bear and bull cases for FY2027–FY2028 and fades back.

The investment case for the fleet rests on two ships whose terms we do not know. Omera Liberty (BDT 7.43bn) and Omera Pride (BDT 0.95bn) were in work-in-progress at March 2026 [5 p.19]. We assume they earn revenue equal to 30% of their cost a year, below the 44% the old fleet earned on its carrying amount in FY2025 (the old ships were bought cheaper and are partly depreciated) [1 p.245], and that they sail for half of FY2027F. That adds about BDT 2.5bn a year of revenue and, at a 45% gross margin, about BDT 1.1bn of gross profit, against roughly BDT 0.8bn a year of interest on the BRAC Bank loan at 11%. The ships therefore pay their way in our base case but add little to EPS until the debt is reduced. A 25% freight slump in FY2027–FY2028 cuts FY2027F EPS to BDT 6.27 and fair value to BDT 78.

Omera Petroleum sells 22% of Bangladesh's LPG but earned 0.6% on equity in FY2025; we value MJL's stake at BDT 3.7 a share

Bangladesh's LPG market grew quickly as piped-gas connections for homes were stopped and gas pressure fell; LPG is now the main cooking fuel outside the gas grid and a growing industrial and autogas fuel. The market is crowded, with more than two dozen licensed operators competing on price and cylinder availability, and the Bangladesh Energy Regulatory Commission (BERC) sets a monthly maximum retail price linked to the Saudi Aramco contract price and the exchange rate. Import costs therefore pass through with a lag, but the retail cap and competition squeeze the distribution margin.

Omera Petroleum's own statements show the squeeze. FY2025 revenue rose 23% to BDT 31.1bn on 13% higher volume, gross profit was BDT 2.85bn (9.2% of revenue), and operating profit BDT 2.29bn; but finance cost of BDT 1.93bn on BDT 14.3bn of short-term loans left profit before tax of BDT 370mn, and tax of BDT 340mn (current tax BDT 307mn, close to 1% of revenue, the turnover-based minimum) left BDT 30mn [1 p.142] [1 p.276] [1 p.271]. Its equity was BDT 4.64bn, so return on equity was 0.6%. In the nine months to March 2026 LPG revenue fell 11.9% to BDT 21.3bn on lower LPG prices [5 p.31], and the minority partners' share of profit was a loss of BDT 102mn, which implies an OPL loss of about BDT 270mn [5 p.3]; the third quarter was profitable (minority share +BDT 112mn) as the Totalgaz volume came in.

We model LPG revenue +10% in FY2027F (a full year of Premier LP Gas) and +6% a year after that, a gross margin of 8.75% (the midpoint of FY2025's 9.9% and the nine months' 7.6%), 44% of group overheads and interest on LPG debt of BDT 18.5bn scaled with revenue [10]. The result is LPG profit before tax of about BDT -15mn in FY2027F, below the minimum tax, so LPG loses money after tax in every forecast year and the minorities' share is negative. That is the main reason group EPS grows slowly despite growing revenue. Each 1pp of LPG gross margin is worth about BDT 330mn of pre-tax profit in FY2027F; a 1pp gain from Totalgaz synergies lifts fair value to BDT 89, and a 1.5pp loss cuts it to BDT 68.

Valued on its own fundamentals, OPL earns below any plausible cost of equity: a justified price-to-book (ROE − g)/(Ke − g) is negative at a 0.6% ROE. Its value rests on its assets (terminal, barges, cylinders) and its market position, so we take 0.4 times its BDT 4.64bn book in the base case (0.2 times bear, 0.6 times bull), BDT 1.86bn for 100%, of which MJL's 62.5% is BDT 3.7 a share and the minorities' 37.5% (BDT 697mn) is deducted in our DCF [10]. Sum of the parts is not used: OPL is well under 15% of fair value at any reasonable multiple and is already inside the consolidated cash flows, so a separate leg would add precision we do not have.

Policy touches every line: BERC caps LPG prices, the taka sets base-oil cost, and the 10-year bond is 9.27%

Four outside forces drive MJL's lines. First, the exchange rate: base oil and LPG are imported in dollars, so a weaker taka raises cost of sales before prices catch up. Second, regulation: BERC sets LPG retail prices each month; lubricant prices are free, which is why the lubricant margin is steadier than the LPG margin. Third, interest rates: with BDT 31.6bn of debt, every 1pp of borrowing cost is about BDT 316mn of pre-tax profit, or BDT 0.79 a share; Bangladesh Bank's tight policy kept the 10-year government bond at 9.27% in October 2026 and the banks' average lending rate at 12.13% [8]. Fourth, demand: lubricant and LPG volumes follow vehicle use, industrial output and household incomes, all of which slowed in FY2025 and are recovering after the 2026 election.

Tax policy matters too. MJL's own effective tax rate was 21.4% in FY2025 and 19.8% in the nine months to March 2026 [1 p.227] [5 p.6]; the nine-month review cites a higher minimum tax and the end of a tax exemption on the tankers as reasons for lower profit [9]. Omera Petroleum pays tax on turnover even when it makes little profit, which turns small LPG margins into after-tax losses. We use 21% for lubricants and tankers and the higher of 27.5% of profit or 1% of revenue for LPG [10].

Debt tripled to BDT 31.6bn in three years; cash from operations covered EPS in two of the last three years

Earnings quality is mixed. Operating cash flow per share was BDT 14.79 in FY2024, 8.67 in FY2025 and 9.26 in FY2026 against EPS of 8.71, 11.36 and 11.04 [6]; FY2025's shortfall is the tanker gain, which is investing cash, and FY2026's gap includes the unexplained fourth-quarter item. In the nine months to March 2026 operating cash flow was BDT 15.83 a share, because the group paid suppliers less [6]. One-off items are large: the FY2025 gain was 46% of that year's attributable profit [1 p.250], and FY2025 also booked BDT 81.5mn of gains on listed shares, mostly Prime Bank [1 p.251] [1 p.240]. The auditor, Hoda Vasi Chowdhury, gave an emphasis of matter and an other-matter paragraph on the FY2025 statements [6]; the details sit on the DSE site and are not in our corpus.

The balance sheet has changed more than the income statement. Borrowings were BDT 8.4bn in June 2021 and BDT 31.6bn in March 2026, net debt to equity (including minorities) rose from 0.52x to 1.49x, and interest cover (EBIT over financial charges) fell from 11.4x in FY2021 to 2.4x in FY2026E [10]. About BDT 18.5bn of the debt sits in OPL and OCL, mostly short-term trade finance (UPAS and LATR) from foreign and local banks; MJL itself owes about BDT 13.1bn, including the BRAC Bank tanker loan [5 p.2] [5 p.5] [5 p.27]. CRISL rates the company AAA with a stable outlook [6]. Working capital also rose: advances, deposits and prepayments jumped to BDT 9.27bn at March 2026 from 0.96bn [5 p.2], which we read as advances for property, vessels and the LPG business; we assume part of it unwinds in FY2027F.

Dividends have been cash only since FY2019, at 55%, 50%, 50%, 52%, 52% and 50% of face value for FY2021–FY2026 [1 p.215] [6]: BDT 5.0–5.5 a share, a payout of 45–79% of EPS (median 60%). There is no regulator's cap on cash dividends for a non-bank company, and there were no rights issues, bonus shares or bonds in the last 24 months [6]. We keep a 60% payout; with debt falling from FY2027F, DPS rises to BDT 6.07 in FY2028F.

We forecast EPS of BDT 7.52 in FY2027F and 14.32 in FY2031F: interest cost first, new-ship freight later

FY2026E follows the filings. We take the nine months to March 2026 as reported and add a fourth quarter equal to the third quarter, line by line: revenue BDT 11.5bn, gross profit BDT 1.98bn, overheads BDT 322mn, other income BDT 111mn, financial charges BDT 668mn and tax BDT 343mn [5 p.3]. The third quarter is the right base because it is the first with a full quarter of Premier LP Gas and of the larger fleet. That gives attributable profit of BDT 2,523mn (EPS BDT 7.96). The DSE-announced EPS of BDT 11.04 implies BDT 3,497mn [6]; the BDT 974mn difference sits on its own line in the income statement, as an unexplained fourth-quarter item, likely a one-off such as an asset gain, a tax true-up or an acquisition accounting entry. It is booked profit and stays in the book; because its nature is unknown, our forecast does not project it. When the audited annual is filed we will replace the residual with the reported lines.

From FY2027F each line has its own driver. Lubricant revenue = volume (+3%, then +4%) × price (+4%), at a 31.9% gross margin. Tanker revenue = existing fleet (BDT 3.2bn, +3% a year) plus new vessels (30% of their BDT 8.4bn cost a year, half in FY2027F), times a freight factor, at a 45% gross margin. LPG revenue grows 10% then 6% at an 8.75% gross margin. Overheads grow 7% a year; other income (dividends, deposit interest, rent) is BDT 450mn with no asset gains; financial charges are 11% of opening debt; tax is 21% on lubricants and tankers and the LPG minimum tax [10]. Capex is BDT 2.5bn in FY2027F (half of the Gulshan property plus maintenance) and 1.1 times depreciation after that; working capital falls back to its FY2021–FY2025 average of 16.3% of revenue by FY2028F, which frees cash to cut debt.

The result is EPS of BDT 7.52 in FY2027F, 10.11 in FY2028F and 14.32 in FY2031F. FY2027F is below FY2026E core EPS of 7.96 by BDT 0.45: new-ship freight and lubricant growth add gross profit, but financial charges rise to BDT 3.47bn on the March 2026 debt while the new tankers sail only half the year. Return on equity is 12.3% in FY2027F and 17.3% in FY2031F, against core ROE of 14.0%–20.6% over FY2022–FY2026 (median 15.9%) [10]. Quarterly EPS swings widely (BDT 0.80 to 3.43 in the last seven quarters) with LPG prices, freight and one-offs, so single quarters are a poor guide [6].

What is coming next sets the shape of the forecast. Three events are already under way: the two new tankers enter service in FY2027, the Totalgaz cylinders and Chattogram plant are being folded into Omera Petroleum, and debt has to come down from its March 2026 peak. Two are decisions still ahead: whether MJL keeps spending (management talks of mid-term fleet expansion [1 p.50]) and what the Gulshan-1 property is for (the board called it an investment for future business expansion [6]). Our base case assumes no further vessel purchase beyond Omera Liberty and Omera Pride; another ship bought with debt would add revenue but also delay the fall in interest cost that drives our EPS recovery from FY2028F. On the lubricant side, the company's priorities are to defend its leadership with Mobil technology and services while the market recovers [1 p.50]; we do not assume share gains beyond the market's recovery, so the lubricant forecast is driven by market volume and price, not by MJL taking customers from rivals.

Fair value range BDT 72–87: DCF BDT 84, justified P/E BDT 75, justified P/B BDT 73

Cost of equity is 14.7%: the 10-year Treasury bond cut-off of 9.268% (25-Oct-2026) [8] plus a beta of 0.77 times a 7.0% equity risk premium. The beta is the Blume-adjusted value of a raw 0.66 from 104 weekly returns against the DSEX (R² 0.26) [7]; it is above the F25 floor of 0.7, so the floor does not bind. After-tax cost of debt is 8.1% (11% × (1 − 26%)); 11% sits between the third-quarter run-rate of 8.5%, which benefits from dollar trade finance from HSBC, Standard Chartered and Citibank, and the 12.13% average bank lending rate that applies to taka term loans [8], and at market weights (equity 48%) the WACC is 11.3% [10]. Terminal growth is 4.5% in nominal taka, the middle of the F25 spec's 4–5% band.

Discounted cash flow (50%): free cash flow to the firm for FY2027F–FY2031F (NOPAT plus depreciation, less capex and working-capital investment), plus a terminal value of FY2031F NOPAT × (1 + g) × (1 − g/RONIC) / (WACC − g), where RONIC is the FY2031F return on invested capital, 11.4%. Reinvestment is therefore g/RONIC = 40% of NOPAT, consistent with the returns in the forecast. Enterprise value is BDT 55.4bn, 63% of it terminal. We deduct FY2026E net debt of BDT 31.3bn and the minorities' share of OPL (BDT 697mn) and add listed shares at market (BDT 1,461mn): BDT 84.3 a share.

Justified P/E (30%): forward P/E = (1 − g/ROE)/(Ke − g) = 7.21x at a sustainable ROE of 17.0% (the FY2029F–FY2031F average), applied to normalised EPS of BDT 10.38 (sustainable ROE × average FY2027F book), not to the FY2027F trough EPS of 7.52: BDT 74.9. Justified P/B (20%): (ROE − g)/(Ke − g) = 1.22x on FY2026E NAV of BDT 59.90: BDT 73.3. The sustainable ROE of 17.0% sits inside the company's FY2022–FY2026 core range of 14.0%–20.6% and above its median of 15.9%, because debt falls and the tankers mature by FY2029F; it is not a peak-year figure. We use no historical P/E: DSE floor prices distorted FY2022–FY2023, and the pre-floor average of 12.7x (FY2019–FY2021) reflects a less indebted company.

The legs reconcile. P/E and P/B rest on the same sustainable ROE and payout (1 − g/ROE), so they differ only by the book they start from (average FY2027F versus FY2026E). The DCF differs because it values the actual path: the FY2027F trough, when a full year of interest arrives before the new ships earn a full year (EPS BDT 7.52 against normalised 10.38), costs it value, while the release of working capital adds value. The FY2026 fourth-quarter residual (BDT 974mn) is booked profit and is inside the FY2026 book in both the P/E and P/B legs and in the DCF's opening net debt; what we do not know is whether it repeats, so none of the legs projects it forward. The DCF is highest because it values the release of working capital (2.6bn by FY2028F) and discounts at a WACC that gives credit for cheap trade finance. Weights favour the DCF (50%) because debt and capital spending dominate this story; P/E gets 30% as the spec's primary lubricant multiple. Implied multiples of the base value: 10.5x FY2027F EPS, 1.32x FY2026E NAV, 6.4x FY2027F EV/EBITDA and a 5.7% FY2027F dividend yield [10]. The current price is 12.1x FY2027F EPS.

Scenarios move the same drivers as the risk table, symmetrically. Bear (25%): lubricant volume 3pp lower in FY2027F and 2pp lower in FY2028F, lubricant margin −2pp for two years, freight −15%, LPG margin −1pp and borrowing cost +150bp, all fading back by FY2030F; OPL at 0.2x book. Bull (25%): the mirror image, OPL at 0.6x book. The cost of equity is the same in all three. Bear BDT 72.0, base 79.3, bull 87.1; probability-weighted 79.4. Terminal ROE is 17.0%, 17.3% and 17.5% in the three cases, all inside the company's own range. A fully stacked stress (risk-table sizes for base oil, LPG margin, freight and rates together on top of the bear case, faded back by FY2030F like the bear) gives BDT 68.9, shown outside the range [10]. In every case Omera Petroleum's equity is floored at zero inside the DCF: its BDT 18.5bn of debt sits in the subsidiary, and limited liability means MJL's shareholders cannot lose more than the stake (the floor adds BDT 5.8 a share in the base).

Reverse check: at BDT 90.8 the market is paying 12.1x our FY2027F EPS and 1.52x FY2026E book. That is above our bull blend (BDT 87): the price implies bull-case operating assumptions plus a cost of equity about 1pp below ours (our DCF at Ke − 1pp and 4.5% growth is BDT 96).

Six risks: a Mobil licence setback is the largest (fair value BDT 59), an LPG price war the most likely (BDT 68)

Each risk below moves a named line in the model; fair value and FY2027F EPS after each shock (one at a time, base otherwise) come from recalculating the whole workbook [10]. The bear case moves the same drivers at smaller, fading sizes.

• LPG price war (likely, high impact). More than two dozen operators and BERC's monthly price cap squeeze the distribution margin. LPG gross margin −1.5pp in every year → FY2027F EPS BDT 6.54, fair value BDT 68.
• Borrowing costs (likely, medium). BDT 31.6bn of debt reprices with policy rates and the taka. Interest rate +200bp → EPS 6.15, fair value BDT 74.
• Base oil and the taka (possible, medium). Base oil +10% with the taka 5% weaker: lubricant margin −3pp in FY2027F and −1.5pp in FY2028F → EPS 6.83, fair value BDT 79.
• Freight slump (possible, medium). Tanker revenue −25% in FY2027–FY2028 → EPS 6.27, fair value BDT 78.
• Mobil licence (unlikely, very high). Lubricant volume −30% from FY2028F → fair value BDT 59 (FY2027F EPS unchanged).
• Opportunity: Totalgaz synergies. LPG gross margin +1pp in every year → EPS 8.17, fair value BDT 89.
• Governance and related parties (context). Inter-company loans to Omera Fuels and MJL (Singapore) and the jointly bought Gulshan property with EC Holdings; the auditor's emphasis of matter for FY2025. These do not move a model line, but they are why we deduct nothing for related-party assets beyond what the balance sheet shows.

Five signposts to FY2027 results: the Q4 item, freight on the new ships, LPG margin, debt and lubricant volume

• The FY2026 annual report: what the BDT 974mn fourth-quarter item was. If it is recurring, FY2027F EPS rises by up to BDT 3.08.
• Tanker revenue per quarter: our base needs about BDT 1,452mn a quarter by FY2028F once both new ships sail.
• LPG gross margin: consolidated less standalone gross profit over LPG revenue; our base is 8.75%, the nine months were 7.6%.
• Borrowings: our base cuts debt to BDT 30.3bn by June 2027 as working capital unwinds; a rise instead would point to the bear case.
• Lubricant revenue: +7–8% a year (volume plus price) in our base; another year of decline would test the Mobil franchise.

Financials and data (label allowed)

Model note: FY2026 (to 30-Jun-2026) audited statements are not yet filed; FY2026E uses the nine-month filing plus the DSE-announced EPS, NAV and dividend, with the unexplained fourth-quarter amount on its own residual line. The model will be updated in place when the annual report is filed.

FAQ

What does MJL Bangladesh do?

It blends and sells Mobil lubricants under licence from ExxonMobil, runs oil tankers, and owns 62.5% of Omera Petroleum, an LPG importer and bottler with about 22% of the Bangladesh market.

Who owns MJL Bangladesh?

EC Securities of the East Coast Group holds 52.06% and state-owned Jamuna Oil 19.45%; institutions and individuals hold the rest.

Why is FY2026 EPS of BDT 11.04 not the base for the forecast?

The nine months produced BDT 5.91 and the fourth quarter BDT 5.13; a quarter at the third-quarter run-rate explains BDT 2.05, and the remaining BDT 3.08 is booked profit not yet explained by a filing; it stays in the FY2026 book, but because whether it recurs is unknown, we do not project it.

Why does LPG earn so little?

Omera Petroleum's FY2025 gross profit of BDT 2.85bn went mostly on BDT 1.93bn of interest and overheads, and a turnover-based minimum tax took most of the rest: profit after tax was BDT 30mn.

What is the fair value range?

BDT 72–87, base BDT 79.3, probability-weighted 79.4, from DCF (50%), justified P/E (30%) and justified P/B (20%) at a 14.7% cost of equity.

Sources

1. MJL Bangladesh PLC Annual Report 2024-25 (audited consolidated and separate statements to 30-Jun-2025, notes, CEO's review, subsidiary reports of Omera Petroleum and Omera Cylinders) · link · accessed 2026-10-31
2. MJL Bangladesh PLC Annual Report 2022-23 (consolidated statements to 30-Jun-2023 with FY2022 comparatives) · link · accessed 2026-10-31
3. MJL Bangladesh Limited Annual Report 2021-22 (consolidated statements to 30-Jun-2022 with FY2021 comparatives) · link · accessed 2026-10-31
4. MJL Bangladesh Limited Annual Report 2019-20 (consolidated statements to 30-Jun-2020 with FY2019 comparatives) · link · accessed 2026-10-31
5. MJL Bangladesh PLC un-audited Q3 financial statements, nine months to 31-Mar-2026 (consolidated and separate) · link · accessed 2026-10-31
6. DSE announcements for MJLBD, Nov-2024 to Oct-2026 (FY2026 EPS 11.04, NAV 59.90, NOCFPS 9.26 and 50% cash dividend on 28-Oct-2026; quarterly EPS; Premier LP Gas acquisition; Gulshan property; CRISL AAA rating) · link · accessed 2026-10-31
7. AnalystBro market data: DSE:MJLBD weekly and monthly bars and DSEX weekly bars (chart_bars), to 29-Oct-2026 · link · accessed 2026-10-31
8. Bangladesh Bank treasury auction cut-off yields (10-year BGTB 9.268%, 25-Oct-2026) and Scheduled Banks Statistics weighted-average lending rate 12.13% · link · accessed 2026-10-31
9. AnalystBro JAMUNAOIL initiation, 31-Oct-2026 (Jamuna Oil PLC Annual Report FY2025 figures; Jamuna holds 19.45% of MJLBD) · link · accessed 2026-10-31
10. AnalystBro MJLBD model (model.xlsx): forecasts, valuation, scenarios, sensitivities · link · accessed 2026-10-31