LankaBangla Finance financial analysis: 13.7% NPL, BDT 4.3bn deferred provision shortfall, FY2025 accounts not filed (Oct 2026)

Investment considerations: a 13.7% NPL, a BDT 4.3bn deferred provision gap and a year of missing filings outweigh a growing retail franchise

LankaBangla Finance PLC is one of Bangladesh's larger non-bank financial institutions (NBFIs), licensed by Bangladesh Bank (BB) and listed on the Dhaka Stock Exchange (DSE) since 2006 [6]. It lends to corporates, small and medium firms and households, issues Mastercard and Visa credit cards, and owns a stockbroker (LankaBangla Securities), a merchant bank (LankaBangla Investments) and an asset manager [1 p.120] [1 p.150]. At December 2024 the solo company had BDT 61.5bn of loans funded by BDT 42.3bn of deposits (42.1bn of them term deposits) and BDT 22.7bn of borrowings [1 p.88].

The filing gap comes first. LankaBangla files late. Its FY2024 accounts were approved on 14-Oct-2025, nine and a half months after the year end, after board meetings set for 24-Aug-2025 were postponed [1 p.89] [5]. The same board meeting released the Q1, Q2 and Q3 2025 interims [5]. As of 31-Oct-2026, the DSE news archive shows no FY2025 results, no FY2025 dividend decision and no 2026 interim; the last company announcement is the election of a new chairman on 29-Dec-2025 [5]. This note therefore uses the audited FY2024 annual report, the consolidated nine-month statement to 30-Sep-2025, and DSE announcements, each labelled. There are no DSE-announced FY2025 figures to use. Everything after September 2025 is unknown from filings.

The investment picture is a lender under credit stress. In 2024 the NPL ratio nearly doubled to 13.74%, BB allowed the company to defer BDT 4,265m of required provisions, the auditor added four emphasis-of-matter paragraphs, the board proposed no dividend for 2024, and solo equity fell by a quarter to BDT 7.1bn [1 p.79] [1 p.88] [5]. Against that, the franchise is intact on several measures: individual depositors grew their balances by 13% in 2024, the credit-card book grew 13%, consolidated deposits rose 6.6% in the first nine months of 2025, and the group stayed profitable at the attributable level in every reported 2025 quarter [1 p.132] [1 p.120] [2 p.1] [16].

Business model: corporate, CMSME and card lending, funded by term deposits, bank lines and BB refinance

LankaBangla runs three lending businesses. Corporate finance (term loans, leases, syndications and short-term lines) was BDT 25.3bn at Dec-2024 including a BDT 2.5bn loan to its own subsidiary; retail finance (credit cards, home, auto and personal loans) was BDT 17.5bn; and CMSME finance (cottage, micro, small and medium enterprises) was BDT 18.7bn [1 p.120]. By industry the largest exposures were trade and commerce (BDT 14.4bn), food processing (BDT 4.8bn), individual housing (BDT 6.9bn) and NGOs (BDT 2.6bn) [1 p.122].

Mastercard and Visa receivables of BDT 5.67bn earned BDT 1,087m of interest in 2024, plus BDT 147m of card fees [1 p.121] [1 p.141] [1 p.142]. Cards are high-yield but unsecured; card provisions were BDT 249m at Dec-2024 [1 p.135]. BB approved changes to the memorandum and articles in December 2024 so that the company can start Islamic Shariah-based financing [5].

As an NBFI, LankaBangla cannot take current or savings deposits. It funds itself with term deposits (BDT 42.1bn), bank loans, BB refinance schemes, zero-coupon and subordinated bonds, and dollar loans from foreign impact funds [1 p.88] [1 p.128] [1 p.131]. Income comes from the loan spread, interest on bank placements, a listed-share portfolio (dividends and capital gains), loan and card fees, and, at group level, stockbroking commission [1 p.141] [1 p.142].

Loan growth: the book shrank 2.8% in 2024 as CMSME fell 23%, and part of corporate growth was a loan to a subsidiary

The group loan book grew from BDT 58.5bn in 2020 to 65.4bn in 2023 and then shrank 2.8% to BDT 63.5bn in 2024 [1 p.64] [16]. Business disbursement peaked at BDT 43.8bn in 2022 and fell to BDT 38.6bn in 2024 [1 p.64]. In the first nine months of 2025 consolidated loans grew 0.9% to BDT 64.1bn [2 p.1] [16].

The mix moved sharply in 2024. CMSME loans fell 23.0% to BDT 18.7bn: the annual report does not explain the fall, but says management has adopted strategies to increase CMSME disbursement because the sector is 'less rate sensitive and more profitable' [1 p.21]. Corporate lending rose 23.1%, but BDT 1.0bn of that increase was the loan to the subsidiary LankaBangla Investments; syndication finance almost doubled to BDT 2.9bn and leases rose to BDT 5.5bn [1 p.120] [16]. Retail grew 3.6%: cards and auto loans grew while personal loans fell 20% [1 p.20] [1 p.120].

So the 2024 book did not grow in the segments where the classified loans sat, and part of the corporate growth was internal. The shift away from CMSME coincided with classified loans doubling; the filings give classified loans by status but not by segment, so the link cannot be measured [1 p.121].

Funding: individual deposits up 13% in 2024, borrowings down BDT 3bn, and an off-balance-sheet BDT 493m FX loss

Deposits are the main funding source, at 63.4% of consolidated deposits and borrowings at Dec-2024 and 66.4% at Sep-2025 [16]. The deposit base is becoming more retail: individuals held BDT 28.1bn (66.6%) at Dec-2024, up from BDT 24.9bn, while deposits from banks and NBFIs fell from BDT 4.8bn to 2.4bn and corporate deposits from BDT 12.7bn to 11.7bn [1 p.132] [16]. Retail liability mobilisation was BDT 12.1bn in 2024 against BDT 9.7bn in 2023, according to the company [1 p.21].

Borrowings fell from BDT 25.7bn to 22.7bn in 2024 [1 p.88]. BB refinance and pre-finance schemes for women entrepreneurs, CMSMEs, agro-processing and long-term infrastructure (IPFF) were the largest block at BDT 6.7bn; the COVID-19 stimulus refinance fell from BDT 2.6bn to 0.4bn as it was repaid [1 p.129]. Secured bank term loans were BDT 6.3bn, REPO against treasury bonds BDT 2.6bn, short-term bank lines BDT 3.1bn, and bonds BDT 1.5bn [1 p.128] [1 p.130]. Dollar loans from BlueOrchard, Healthier Lives and responsAbility were BDT 1.3bn at the original exchange rates [1 p.131].

The dollar loans carry a hidden cost. The interest rate is 4.5%, but the taka fell, so realised exchange losses of BDT 328m in 2024 (BDT 215m in 2023) went through interest expense [1 p.142]. With BB's approval the company translates these loans at the original rate, not the year-end rate, so an unrealised loss of BDT 492.64m is off the balance sheet; the auditor notes it will be recognised over 2025 and 2026 [1 p.79] [1 p.131].

Maturities are short relative to assets. Within one year, BDT 34.3bn of deposits and BDT 15.6bn of borrowings fall due against BDT 42.1bn of loans, a gap of BDT 7.8bn on our arithmetic, narrower than BDT 9.9bn a year earlier [1 p.121] [1 p.131] [1 p.132] [16]. That gap is normally bridged by rolling deposits and bank lines and by BDT 8.2bn of bank balances [1 p.88]; it makes deposit confidence central.

Line items: the spread widened to 2.5pp in 2024, but share gains vanished, the 2023 building gain did not recur and tax took 73%

Spread. On our definitions the solo loan yield rose from 9.50% in 2023 to 12.24% in 2024 and the cost of funds from 8.02% to 9.78%, so the spread widened from 1.48% to 2.46%; the 2023 averages use the 2022 balances in the 2023 annual report [4 p.258] [16]. The company's own BB-format 'cost of fund' was 10.99% for 2024 against 8.63% for 2023 [1 p.163]; it uses a different denominator and we do not mix the two. The company says net interest income rose on 'higher yield rate' and that interest expense rose with 'higher cost of fund and higher dollar rate' [1 p.154].

Net interest income rose from BDT 1,060m to BDT 1,761m [1 p.90]. Interest on deposits rose 21% to BDT 4,356m as the cost of deposits went from 8.36% to 10.29%; interest on borrowings, including the FX loss, rose to BDT 2,151m [1 p.141] [16]. Each 1pp rise in the cost of deposits cost about BDT 423m a year on the average 2024 deposit balance, more than five times 2024 solo profit [16].

Interest suspense. Income booked is not all income received. Interest suspense on the solo book rose from BDT 934m to BDT 1,498m, and BDT 1,097m of that is interest on the subsidiary loan, charged at 11% for July 2019 to December 2024 on BB's instruction of 26-May-2025 and parked in suspense rather than income [1 p.120] [1 p.133]. Excluding it, suspense fell, because BDT 600m was realised and BDT 160m written off [1 p.135]. Interest received in cash (BDT 8,248m) was close to interest income (BDT 8,269m) [1 p.91].

Investment and other income. Investment income fell from BDT 758m to 618m: capital gains on shares collapsed from BDT 401m to 22m in a weak market, partly offset by BDT 322m from treasury bills and bonds [1 p.142]. Other operating income fell from BDT 1,172m to 527m because 2023 included a BDT 650m profit on the sale of a building [1 p.142] [1 p.154]. Non-recurring items were 35.1% of 2023 operating income and 0.8% of 2024's [16].

Costs, provisions and tax. Operating expenses rose 6.5% to BDT 1,854m, led by salaries (BDT 912m) and depreciation and repairs; cost/income was 63.8% [1 p.90] [16]. The loan-provision charge fell from BDT 794m to BDT 620m even as classified loans doubled; the company explains the lower charge by the 'short provision against classified loans', meaning the deferral [1 p.154]. Tax of BDT 209m on profit before tax of BDT 286m gave an effective rate of 73%, because provisions are not fully deductible [1 p.90] [16].

2025 so far: nine-month profit down 18%, Q3 net interest income halved, and Q4 2024 was a loss quarter

The only 2025 figures are consolidated and unaudited. In the nine months to September 2025 net interest income rose 7.8% to BDT 1,921m, but investment income fell from BDT 889m to 514m, loan provisions rose from BDT 679m to 980m, and attributable profit fell 18% to BDT 294m (EPS BDT 0.54 against 0.67) [2 p.1] [16]. The company gave the reasons to DSE as lower investment income, higher loan-loss provisions and a higher cost of borrowed funds [5]. The Financial Express also reported that the 2024 results were released more than six months late [7].

Quarter by quarter, attributable EPS was BDT 0.03 in Q1 2025, 0.18 in Q2 and 0.34 in Q3, all positive, against 0.15, 0.05 and 0.46 in the same quarters of 2024 [5]. The quarter that lost money was Q4 2024: full-year 2024 EPS was BDT 0.51 against 0.67 for the first nine months, both as announced on DSE, which implies a fourth-quarter loss of about BDT 85m (EPS -0.16) [5] [16]. In that quarter tax of BDT 98m exceeded profit before tax of BDT 13m [1 p.85] [2 p.1] [16].

Q3 2025 itself was weaker underneath than the headline. Interest income fell 15% year on year to BDT 2,299m while interest expense was flat, so quarterly net interest income nearly halved to BDT 454m; profit held up because loan provisions fell to BDT 301m and BDT 128m of investment provisions were released [2 p.1] [16]. Interest expense took 80.3% of interest income in Q3 2025 against 67.9% a year earlier [16]. Consolidated operating cash flow was BDT 3.41 a share for the nine months against BDT 5.00 [5].

Asset quality: classified loans BDT 8.4bn, provisions kept 14% of them, and a BDT 4.3bn shortfall on a BB deferral

Asset quality broke in 2024. Classified loans rose from BDT 4,576m to BDT 8,446m; within them, bad/loss loans rose from BDT 2,309m to BDT 6,020m and doubtful from BDT 569m to 1,594m [1 p.121]. Special-mention loans (overdue but not yet classified) fell from BDT 9,444m to 4,462m, which suggests that much of the 2023 SMA book migrated into classified; classified plus SMA was 22.7% of loans in 2023 and 21.0% in 2024 [16]. Over five years the reported solo NPL ratio went 4.70%, 6.57%, 7.22%, 7.41% and 13.74% [1 p.67]. Classification follows DFIM Circular 04 of 26-Jul-2021 and related circulars, as the auditor notes [1 p.80].

The deferral. Total provisions required on loans and other assets were BDT 7,896m and BDT 3,631m was kept; BB, by letter DFIM(C)1054/31/2025-2835 of 4-Sep-2025, let the company finalise its statements with a shortfall of BDT 4,265m [1 p.135]. The quick summary report behind the figure was BB letter FIID(I-/19/2)/2025-636 of 24-Jun-2025, and the auditor repeats it as the first emphasis of matter [1 p.79]. For loans alone the requirement was BDT 7,484m against BDT 3,219m kept; in BB's highlight format, provisions kept against classified loans were BDT 1,199m, or 14% of classified loans, down from 46% [1 p.135] [1 p.163] [16]. The filings do not say how long the deferral lasts or how the shortfall is to be made up.

To size it: the shortfall is 60% of solo equity of BDT 7,102m and larger than the BDT 1,600m of capital above the 10% minimum [1 p.139] [16]. Deducting it from regulatory capital without any tax or risk-weight effect would leave a CAR of about 5.2%; deducting it from equity would leave about BDT 2.8bn, or BDT 5.26 a share, against the reported solo NAV of BDT 13.18 [16]. These are our illustrative arithmetic, not company figures; tax deductibility of provisions and the timing BB allows would change them.

Capital and returns: solo CAR 12.9%, solo ROE 0.9%, and equity down BDT 2.4bn in one year

Solo capital adequacy fell from 14.15% to 12.89% in 2024, as total capital fell from BDT 9.7bn to 7.1bn [1 p.139]. Risk-weighted assets also fell, from BDT 68.6bn to 55.3bn, which cushioned the ratio [1 p.139]. The company's five-year highlight table gives 13.17% for the same year, and the group table gives 15.69% while note 13.3 gives 19.68% for the group; we use the note figures and flag the inconsistency [1 p.64] [1 p.67] [1 p.139]. Either way the ratio was above the 10% minimum only because of the deferral.

Solo equity fell from BDT 9.5bn to 7.1bn in 2024 for four reasons: a BDT 875m prior-year correction (a 2012 stock dividend from LankaBangla Securities wrongly booked as income), a BDT 1,061m fall in the revalued carrying amount of the subsidiaries, the BDT 539m dividend for 2023, and profit of only BDT 77m [1 p.92] [1 p.102]. Solo ROE fell from 5.7% in 2021 to 0.9% in 2024 and group ROE from 12.6% to 2.9% [16]. Solo equity/assets fell from 13.6% to 8.6% [16].

Subsidiaries: a profitable broker, a merchant bank that owes LBF BDT 2.5bn plus BDT 1.1bn of unbooked interest, and a loss-making asset manager

LankaBangla owns 86.89% of LankaBangla Securities, effectively all of LankaBangla Investments and LankaBangla Asset Management, and majorities in LankaBangla Information System and BizBangla Media [1 p.150]. In the solo books the subsidiaries are carried at a revalued amount (IFRS 9): BDT 3,815m at Dec-2024 against BDT 5,752m a year earlier, below their cost of BDT 4,040m [1 p.140].

LankaBangla Securities is the stockbroker: profit after tax BDT 115m in 2024, flat on 2023, with group brokerage commission of BDT 595m [1 p.142] [1 p.154]. It carries BDT 4.5bn of margin and client debit balances, against which the group keeps BDT 114m of margin-loan provisions and BDT 627m of provisions for negative equity [1 p.120] [1 p.135]. LankaBangla Investments is the merchant bank. It owes LBF BDT 2,524m; it reported profit of BDT 173m but has not recognised BDT 1,097m of interest that LBF charged on BB's instruction, the second emphasis of matter [1 p.79] [1 p.120] [1 p.155]. LBF values its stake at BDT 118m against a cost of BDT 2,405m, after adjusting the subsidiary's NAV for that unpaid interest [1 p.140]. LankaBangla Asset Management lost BDT 62m in 2024 after a BDT 389m loss in 2023 [1 p.155].

For a shareholder, the subsidiaries add brokerage income and exposure to stock-market gains, but they also tie up BDT 2.5bn of loans and BDT 4.0bn of equity at cost, and they make the group exposed to the stock market twice: through LBF's own share portfolio and through margin lending [1 p.140] [1 p.120].

Peers: the highest classified-loan ratio and the lowest provision cover among five listed NBFIs on the same BB basis

The peer table uses each company's own 'Highlights' annexure in the Bangladesh Bank format, at the same year (2024) and on a solo basis, so the labels match; LankaBangla's 2025 annual does not exist yet, so the peers' 2024 comparatives from their 2025 reports are used [1 p.163] [8 p.163] [9 p.295] [10 p.312] [11 p.166]. On 'percentage of classified loans', LankaBangla's 13.74% compares with 4.45% at IDLC, 5.83% at IPDC, 0.97% at DBH and 11.46% at NHFIL: gaps of 9.3pp, 7.9pp, 12.8pp and 2.3pp [16].

On 'cost of fund', LankaBangla's 10.99% was 1.94pp above IDLC (9.05%), 2.04pp above IPDC (8.95%), 0.10pp above DBH (10.89%) and 0.40pp below NHFIL (11.39%) [16]. Provisions kept against classified loans covered 14% of LankaBangla's classified loans against 58% at IDLC and 58% at IPDC; IDLC, IPDC and DBH report provision surpluses, while LankaBangla's and NHFIL's lines are blank [16] [8 p.163] [9 p.295] [10 p.312] [11 p.166]. LankaBangla's loans were 1.46 times deposits, the highest of the five, which is why it relies more on bank borrowing [16]. Note that IPDC labels its ratio 'loan to fund' and IDLC 'loans to deposit', so the table recomputes loans/deposits from each company's own loan and deposit lines.

Governance: sponsors own about a third, a new independent chairman since December 2025, and a related-party loan at 35% of capital

On the company's list for 31-Dec-2025, sponsors and directors held 31.76%: Sampath Bank of Sri Lanka 9.47% (51.0m shares), ONE Bank 3.78%, Aneesha Mahial Kundanmal 7.70%, Tahsinul Huque 3.89%, Mahbubul Anam 2.45%, Mohammad Abdul Moyeen 2.45% and director Abrar Anam Chowdhury 2.00% [3 p.1]. DSE's own shareholding tables show sponsors and directors at 33.77% on 30-Sep-2026; DSE's company page shows sponsors and directors at 33.55% at 31-Dec-2024 and 33.77% at 30-Sep-2026 [6]. The company's 31.76% at 31-Dec-2025 is 1.79pp lower, the same as the 9.65m shares Mr Moyeen gifted to his spouse in October 2025 [5]; neither source explains why DSE's figure does not reflect the transfer, and we report both. In October 2025 Mohammad Abdul Moyeen, a sponsor director and the chairman who signed the 2024 accounts, gifted 9.65m shares to his spouse, a general shareholder [5] [1 p.89]. On 29-Dec-2025 the board elected Ahmad Ahsanul Munir, an independent director, as chairman [5] [3 p.1].

Related parties matter more here than at most peers. Loans to institutions in which directors have an interest were BDT 2,524m, all of it the loan to LankaBangla Investments, equal to 35% of solo capital [1 p.121] [16]. ONE Bank, a sponsor, had BDT 920m of term deposits with LBF at Dec-2024, while LBF held BDT 920m of a ONE Bank bond and ran its bank accounts there [1 p.152]. The former chairman's disclosed interests list 53 companies, including LankaBangla Information System and BizBangla Media, which are group subsidiaries [1 p.151]. The auditor's four emphasis-of-matter paragraphs cover the provision shortfall, the unbooked subsidiary interest, the IAS 21 departure for dollar loans, and the fact that no contribution was made to the workers' profit participation fund in 2024 [1 p.79]. The opinion itself is unmodified [1 p.79].

Dividends: 10% cash for 2021-2023 paid out of more than group profit, then none for 2024

DSE's record shows cash dividends of 15% for 2015, 2016 and 2018, 7.5% for 2017, 7% for 2019, 12% for 2020 and 10% for 2021, 2022 and 2023, with bonus shares every year from 2007 to 2017 and in 2019, and rights issues in 2012 (1R:1) and 2018 (1R:2) [6]. For 2024 the board proposed no dividend [5]; the Financial Express reported this as the first time since the 2006 listing [7]. No dividend has been announced for 2025 because no FY2025 accounts exist [5].

The payouts of 2022 and 2023 were not earned by the solo company: the BDT 539m paid each year was 303% and 317% of solo profit, and 137% of group profit in 2023 [16]. BB's rule since FID Circular 02 of 2003 is that financial institutions with a capital deficit may not distribute dividends [12 p.2]; the filings do not state the conditions BB attached to the 2025 deferral, so whether it restricts dividends is not disclosed [1 p.135].

At BDT 13.1 the shares trade at 0.69x the September 2025 consolidated NAV, 0.99x the December 2024 solo NAV and 33.9x trailing attributable profit to September 2025 [15] [16]; DSE showed a trailing P/E of 34.47 on 25-Oct-2026 [6]. At year ends the price-to-group-book ratio went from 1.68x (2020) to 0.96x (2024) [16]. These are facts about the price, not a view on it.

Bangladesh Bank rules: a deferral, a back-dated interest instruction and an FX accounting waiver shape the 2024 accounts

BB regulates LankaBangla through its Department of Financial Institutions and Markets (DFIM). Four BB decisions shape the 2024 accounts directly: the provision deferral of 4-Sep-2025; the 26-May-2025 instruction to charge 11% interest on the subsidiary loan back to July 2019; the approval to translate dollar loans at historical rates; and the classification and provisioning rules of DFIM Circular 04 of 2021 [1 p.79] [1 p.80] [1 p.120] [1 p.142]. Capital must be at least 10% of risk-weighted assets, and BB does not let finance companies show other comprehensive income, so fair-value changes in subsidiaries go straight to a reserve [1 p.139] [1 p.80]. The group's statutory liquidity reserve was 5.07% against a 5% requirement [1 p.64].

The sector context is severe. IPDC's 2025 annual report states that the finance-company sector's capital adequacy ratio was -23.03% in June 2025 and that BB identified nine NBFIs for liquidation, six of them finalised [9 p.63]. Bangladesh's LDC graduation was moved from 24-Nov-2026 to 24-Nov-2029 by a UN General Assembly decision adopted on 29-Oct-2026 [13] [14]; for a domestic lender the effect runs through rates and the economy.

What's next: the unfiled FY2025 accounts, 2026 dollar-loan maturities, and the FX loss still to be booked

The first thing to watch has no date: the FY2025 audited accounts. They were not filed by 31-Oct-2026 and DSE shows no board-meeting notice for them [5]. They will show whether the BDT 4,265m shortfall shrank, whether NPLs rose further after the 13.74% of December 2024, and whether a dividend is possible. The dated items are these.

The 2026 dollar-loan maturities matter for the exchange-rate line: the loans are carried at 2021 rates, so each repayment crystallises a loss; two of the three loans fell due in May and September 2026, after the last filing, so the 2026 loss is not yet known. A loss was booked this way, as BDT 328m did in 2024 [1 p.131] [1 p.142]. The subordinated bond (BDT 391m at Dec-2024) counts as Tier-2 capital, so its run-off lowers CAR [1 p.139]. Two numbers will tell most of the story when the FY2025 annual appears: the classified-loan ratio and the provision shortfall.

Risks: the deferral, the subsidiary loan and deposit confidence matter most

Each risk is tied to the line it moves; size them against 2024 solo profit before provisions of BDT 1,052m and solo equity of BDT 7.1bn [16].

Key questions: the shortfall, the NPL peak, the subsidiary loan and the filing backlog

FAQ

What is LankaBangla Finance's NPL ratio?

13.74% of solo loans at 31-Dec-2024 (BDT 8,446m), up from 7.41%; no later figure has been filed [1 p.121] [1 p.163].

What is the provision shortfall?

BDT 4,265m at Dec-2024, which BB allowed the company to defer by letter of 4-Sep-2025 [1 p.79] [1 p.135].

Has LankaBangla published its 2025 results?

No. As of 31-Oct-2026 only the nine-month 2025 interim (to 30-Sep-2025) has been filed; the FY2025 annual and 2026 interims are outstanding [5].

Did LankaBangla pay a dividend for 2024?

No; the board proposed no dividend for 2024 [5], which the Financial Express reported as the first time since listing in 2006 [7].

What is its capital adequacy ratio?

12.89% solo at Dec-2024 against a 10% minimum, per note 13.3; the highlights table shows 13.17% [1 p.139] [1 p.67].

Who are the main shareholders?

Sponsors and directors own about a third, led by Sampath Bank of Sri Lanka (9.47%) and ONE Bank (3.78%) [3 p.1].

Sources

1. LankaBangla Finance PLC Annual Report 2024 (audited consolidated and separate statements, year to 31-Dec-2024; approved 14-Oct-2025) · link · accessed 2026-10-31
2. LankaBangla Finance PLC consolidated unaudited financial statements, nine months to 30-Sep-2025 (latest filing) · link · accessed 2026-10-31
3. LankaBangla Finance PLC shareholding position on 31-Dec-2025 · link · accessed 2026-10-31
4. LankaBangla Finance PLC Annual Report 2023 (2022 comparatives) · link · accessed 2026-10-31
5. Dhaka Stock Exchange news archive, LANKABAFIN, 1-Jun-2024 to 31-Oct-2026 (old.dsebd.org) · link · accessed 2026-10-31
6. Dhaka Stock Exchange company page, LANKABAFIN (dividend history, category, shareholding to 30-Sep-2026, P/E) · link · accessed 2026-10-31
7. The Financial Express, 'LankaBangla Finance posts 37pc profit drop, skips dividend for 2024' (16-Oct-2025) · link · accessed 2026-10-31
8. IDLC Finance PLC Integrated Annual Report 2025 (peer; 2024 comparatives) · link · accessed 2026-10-31
9. IPDC Finance PLC Annual Report 2025 (peer; 2024 comparatives) · link · accessed 2026-10-31
10. DBH Finance PLC Annual Integrated Report 2025 (peer; 2024 comparatives) · link · accessed 2026-10-31
11. National Housing Finance PLC Annual Report 2025 (peer; 2024 comparatives) · link · accessed 2026-10-31
12. Bangladesh Bank FID Circular No. 02 (29-Jun-2003), paid-up capital and reserve of financial institutions · link · accessed 2026-10-31
13. The Daily Star, 'Bangladesh gets 3 more years for LDC graduation' (30-Oct-2026) · link · accessed 2026-10-31
14. The Business Standard, 'Bangladesh gets 3 more years for LDC graduation' (30-Oct-2026) · link · accessed 2026-10-31
15. AnalystBro price data (TradingView feed): DSE:LANKABAFIN weekly bars to the week of 25-Oct-2026 · link · accessed 2026-10-31
16. AnalystBro model for this report (workbook tabs below) · link · accessed 2026-10-31