Bangladesh Submarine Cables valuation report: fair value BDT 41.7–104 (Oct 2026)

BSCPLC earns a 74% EBITDA margin on rising volume, but private cables could cut bandwidth prices about 40% by FY29; fair value range BDT 42–104

Bangladesh Submarine Cables PLC (BSCPLC) owns the country's landing stations on two international submarine cables, SEA-ME-WE 4 at Cox's Bazar and SEA-ME-WE 5 at Kuakata, and is joining a third, SEA-ME-WE 6. It sells international internet bandwidth to the international internet gateways (IIGs), mobile operators and data-centre users, mostly as IPLC rent and IP transit, and leases capacity to BSNL in India [1 p.15] [1 p.102]. The government owns about 77% [1 p.43]. The stock is a bet on two numbers: how fast Bangladesh's internet traffic grows, and how fast the price per Gbps falls as private terrestrial cables from India (ITCs) and new private submarine-cable licensees compete.

The latest year was strong. The board's FY2026 results (year to 30-Jun-2026) show basic EPS of BDT 15.14 against 11.01, NAV per share of 102.39 and a 47.5% cash dividend [5]. These are DSE-announced figures; the audited statements were not yet in our filings database. Nine-month revenue to March 2026 was up 28% to BDT 3,769mn, with IPLC rent up 34% [3 p.3]. We model FY2027-31 on utilised Gbps times price per Gbps, with SMW-6 capex and depreciation from the project budget.

Our fair value range is BDT 42–104 with a base of 68 (probability-weighted 70), against a price of 142.5 on 29-Oct-2026. The price is above our bull case. Even 25% volume growth a year with prices falling only 5% a year gives BDT 116 in our grid, so the price also needs a cost of equity well below our 16.3%. Net cash of about BDT 16 a share is a floor under the operating value.

The government owns about 77% and has BDT 1.52bn of equity money waiting to be turned into about 21mn new shares

BSCPLC was incorporated in 2008 to take over the SEA-ME-WE 4 landing station from BTTB, listed on DSE and CSE in 2012, added an IIG licence (commercial operation 2013) and brought SEA-ME-WE 5 into service in 2017 [1 p.15]. It signed the SEA-ME-WE 6 construction and maintenance agreement in September 2021. The new managing director, Targhibul Islam, took charge on 1-Oct-2026 after a period with an additional-charge MD [5].

Government ownership cuts both ways. It brings policy support (the IIG sourcing incentive and GoB loans and equity for SMW-5 and SMW-6) but also policy risk: the ministry and BTRC set the price environment, and successive governments have used BSCPLC to cut retail internet prices, for example a 10% cut across all bandwidth in March 2025 [10]. The auditor qualified the FY2025 opinion because BDT 1,522mn of GoB equity money had not been converted to shares within six months as an FRC notification requires, and on two VAT items [1 p.94]. We use diluted shares (208.07mn) for all per-share values, which assumes conversion at the price implied by the reported diluted EPS.

Capital actions in the last 24 months: 22.13mn shares issued to GoB on 17-Sep-2024 against equity money; cash dividends of 40% for FY2024, 40% for FY2025 and 47.5% for FY2026; no rights issue, stock dividend or bond [5]. ECRL affirmed AAA/ST-1 in December 2025. The SMW-6 funding plan includes BDT 1,569mn of GoB equity to be issued 'at agreed issue price' subject to shareholder and BSEC approval [1 p.43]; we assume the equity money already received covers it, so no further dilution is modelled beyond the 208.07mn diluted shares.

How BSCPLC makes money: it buys capacity on consortium cables (it is a member of the SEA-ME-WE 4 and 5 consortia and has signed for SEA-ME-WE 6), lands it at its own stations, and resells it inside Bangladesh by the circuit (IPLC rent, a fixed monthly charge per circuit), by the megabit of internet access (IP transit, via its own IIG licence) and by space and power at its landing stations (co-location). Its customers are the IIGs that serve internet service providers, the mobile operators, BTCL and corporate users; it also leases capacity to BSNL for north-east India [1 p.15]. It has no retail customers, so it does not compete with ISPs.

What it controls and what it does not: BSCPLC chooses its tariffs, but within a policy frame set by the ministry and BTRC, which also license its competitors. It cannot carry traffic inland on its own fibre (no NTTN licence), so its effective price to an ISP includes a third party's backhaul. The cost base is mostly fixed (cable O&M, staff, depreciation), so each extra Gbps sold on existing capacity is close to pure margin; that is why the FY2026 volume shift lifted profit 38% on revenue growth of about 27%.

Utilised bandwidth grew 23% a year from FY21 to FY25, while the price per Gbps-month fell from BDT 197k to 102k

The revenue engine is simple: utilised capacity (Gbps) times the price per Gbps. Utilised bandwidth rose from 1,564 Gbps in FY2021 to 3,563 Gbps in FY2025 [1 p.15], and the company said in September 2026 that it supplies about 4,000 Gbps (reported by TBS) [8]. Lit capacity jumped to 6,850 Gbps in FY2024 after upgrades, so utilisation fell to 39% and recovered to 52% in FY2025. Volume has never been the constraint; price has.

We compute an implied price as bandwidth revenue (IPLC + IP transit + export) divided by average utilised Gbps. It fell 8% in FY2023, 32% in FY2024 and 17% in FY2025, when private ITC operators carrying bandwidth over land from India took share and BSCPLC cut tariffs to compete. In FY2026E it rose 4% on our estimate, because more traffic moved to BSCPLC's higher-priced IPLC product: IPLC rent rose to BDT 3,205mn in the nine months while IP transit fell to 403mn [3 p.3]. The market price is about BDT 120 per Mbps a month, against Tk 500 in 2016 (seminar figures reported by The Financial Express) [9].

IRU versus lease: almost all revenue is recurring monthly rent (IPLC and IP transit) rather than one-off sales of indefeasible rights of use. Unearned revenue was BDT 434mn at June 2025 [1 p.101], about 11% of revenue, which suggests some advance billing; we did not find an IRU revenue split in the notes and model all revenue as lease-type. The USD element is small on revenue (the BSNL export lease is BDT 30mn a year) but larger on costs: SMW-6 is contracted with SubCom in the US and consortium O&M is shared in dollars, so a weaker taka raises capex and O&M (risk table).

Volume has three drivers. Mobile data is the largest: the operators expanded 4G nationwide after 2018 and launched 5G in selected areas in September 2025 [1 p.43]. Fixed broadband through ISPs is the second, and data centres and content caches are the third, which also explains the rise in co-location revenue. Per-capita bandwidth use in Bangladesh is still low against South-East Asia, which the directors cite as the main opportunity [1 p.43].

Price is the harder call. BSCPLC's implied price per Gbps-month has fallen from about BDT 197k in FY2022 to 107k in FY2026E, roughly halving in four years. Over a longer period the market price per Mbps fell from Tk 75,000 in 2006 to Tk 500 in 2016 and about Tk 120 now (reported by The Financial Express) [9]. Bandwidth is a commodity whose unit cost falls with each new cable generation, so we see no case for a flat price; the question is only the pace.

BSCPLC supplies roughly 30% of Bangladesh's international bandwidth; ITCs carry most of the rest and three private submarine cables are coming

Bangladesh's international internet bandwidth reaches users through two routes: BSCPLC's submarine cables, and terrestrial cables from India run by the ITC licensees. On figures reported by The Financial Express, national use was about 13,500 Gbps in 2026 [9]; the company says it supplies about 4,000 Gbps (reported by TBS) [8]. Dividing one by the other gives BSCPLC roughly 30% of the market, so it is not the dominant supplier its ownership might suggest. BTRC expects demand of about 30,000 Gbps by 2030 (reported by TBS), which is about 20% a year.

Competition is the swing factor for price. The directors' report says BSCPLC 'is no longer the sole agency', that ITC licensees 'already acquired a substantial market share', and that the government has issued three more submarine-cable licences to private companies, expected to start within about a year [1 p.43]. BSCPLC also has no NTTN licence, so it relies on fibre operators to carry bandwidth inland. Speakers at the September 2026 seminar argued prices could fall to Tk 60-70 per Mbps in 2027 if private cables enter (as reported by The Financial Express; not verified) [9], which would be a 40-50% cut from today.

Our base case grows BSCPLC's utilised bandwidth 18% a year in FY27-28, below the roughly 20% market growth, fading to 10% by FY31: BSCPLC keeps most but not all of its share as private cables arrive. That lifts utilised capacity to 7,891 Gbps by FY31F, 36% of the post-SMW-6 lit capacity we assume. Price is the reasoned driver: we take -10% in FY27 (the 2023-25 trend excluding the FY2024 shock), then -20% in FY28 and -15% in FY29 as the three private submarine cables start in 2027, and -10% a year after. That is a cumulative fall of about 39% from FY26 to FY29, most of the move from about Tk120 to Tk60-70 per Mbps that seminar speakers expect if private cables enter (reported by The Financial Express) [9]. The bear case takes the full -45% in FY27.

Why ITCs won share: terrestrial links from India were cheaper per Mbps and closer to Dhaka, and the ITC licensees sell to the same IIGs. BSCPLC's answer was to cut prices (10% in March 2025) and, with the regulator, to reward IIGs that keep at least half their capacity on submarine cable [10] [11]. Its advantage is redundancy and route diversity: two cables today and a third from SEA-ME-WE 6, which matters for operators after cable cuts. Its disadvantages are its dependence on NTTN operators for inland carriage and slower decision-making as a state company.

The private submarine cables are the bigger long-run threat. The directors expected them to start within about a year of the FY2025 report; they would compete on the same product and route. We assume they start in 2027 and drive a -20% price step in FY28 and -15% in FY29 in the base case; the bear takes the full -45% in FY27.

Policy drove FY2026's 38% profit rise; a reversal of the IIG sourcing rule would cut fair value 35%

BSCPLC's revenue is set by policy as much as by markets. In 2025 it gave extra discounts and bonus bandwidth to IIGs that take more than half their capacity from submarine cables, alongside a 10% price cut on all products in March 2025 [11] [10]. The company explains the higher FY26 EPS by revenue and other income growth [5]; the nine-month accounts show IPLC rent up 34% while IP transit fell [3 p.3]. We read this as volume moving from ITCs to submarine cable.

Because a rule can be removed as easily as it was made, we run a case where BTRC drops it: FY27 volume flat, price down 20%, then the base path. It cuts fair value by 35% to BDT 44, and FY28F EPS to 6.33. We keep it as a separate risk rather than inside the bear case, which moves each driver by a 25%-probability amount.

Government ownership also shapes the payout and capital decisions. As 77% owner, the government receives most of any dividend; its project funding for SMW-5 and SMW-6 came partly as equity money that has to be converted at an agreed price, which sets dilution for minority shareholders. We found no BTRC or BSEC rule that caps BSCPLC's cash dividend; the payout has been set by the board at 30-41% of earnings.

EBITDA margin fell from 83% in FY22 to 68% in FY25; we forecast 72% in FY27F and 62% by FY31F as O&M for SMW-6 is added

Costs are small and mostly fixed. The largest cash items in FY2025 were operation and maintenance (BDT 484mn, including consortium O&M of the cables), backhaul, data connectivity and BTRC revenue sharing (313mn), general and administrative costs (263mn) and IP transit purchased from upstream carriers (92mn) [1 p.102]. Backhaul and revenue sharing scale with revenue, so we hold them at 5.8% of revenue (the nine-month FY26 ratio); IP transit cost at 2.0%. O&M grows 8% a year plus BDT 154mn a year for SMW-6 from FY28 (an assumption of about 1.2% of project cost). G&A grows 9% with wages.

Provisions for doubtful debts jumped to BDT 197mn in FY2024 (4.9% of revenue) when IIG customers paid late, and were 2.6% in the nine months to March 2026 [3 p.3]; we use 2.5% (bear 3.5%, bull 1.5%). The EBITDA margin was 68.4% in FY2025 and 73.6% in FY2026E; with prices falling 10% a year and costs rising 8-9%, it drifts to 62.5% by FY31F, inside the FY22-25 range of 68%–83% at the low end.

The cost of a weaker taka sits mostly in O&M and capex. Consortium maintenance and upgrade charges are billed in dollars, and SMW-6 is paid to SubCom in dollars. A 10% fall in the taka, run as a 10% jump in FY27 O&M and a 10% rise in the remaining SMW-6 bill, cuts fair value by 4.4%. Exchange differences in the income statement have been small (a BDT 22.6mn gain in FY2025) because most receivables and payables are in taka [1 p.102].

SMW-6 costs BDT 12.86bn; with BDT 3.7bn left to pay, free cash flow dips to BDT 983mn in FY27F then exceeds BDT 3.6bn a year

SEA-ME-WE 6 is BSCPLC's third cable. The Red Sea situation forced the consortium to add a land segment through Bahrain and Saudi Arabia, which raised the cost to BDT 1,285.75 crore (BDT 12,857.5mn): BDT 476.22 crore from the government (319.28 crore loan, 156.93 crore equity) and BDT 809.53 crore from BSCPLC's own funds [1 p.43]. At June 2025, physical progress was 84% and the system, with about 30 Tbps (15 Tbps each way), was 'expected to be ready for service by the last quarter of 2026'. In September 2026 the company said SMW-6 would be operational in 2027 (reported by TBS) [8]. Capital work in progress was BDT 9,176mn at March 2026 [3 p.2].

We put the remaining BDT 3,682mn into FY26-28 (68% in FY27F), start depreciation in January 2027 over 25 years (an assumption) and add about 15,000 Gbps of lit capacity. Depreciation rises from BDT 444mn in FY26E to 958mn in FY28F, which is why FY28F EPS dips to 10.65. After FY28 capex falls to maintenance (BDT 100mn a year), so free cash flow rises to about BDT 3.1bn a year, three to four times the dividend at our payout path. BSCPLC has also begun the process of joining a fourth cable (company statement reported by TBS) [8]; we have no cost or timing, so it is not modelled.

Working capital is dominated by receivables from IIGs and BTCL: BDT 2,616mn at March 2026, about 52% of annualised revenue [3 p.2], which we hold at 52%. The balance sheet carries BDT 4.5bn of concessional GoB loans at about 2.3% interest, repaid about BDT 250mn a year after FY27. Dividends are paid the year after they are declared.

Funding is not a constraint. BSCPLC held BDT 7.3bn of cash, FDRs and treasury bills at March 2026 against BDT 4.5bn of GoB loans [3 p.2], and generates about BDT 3bn a year of operating cash. The remaining SMW-6 spend of about BDT 3.7bn can be paid from cash while still paying dividends; free cash flow covers dividends 1.1x even in FY27F. After FY28 net cash builds quickly at our payout path, which is why the payout assumption, while value-neutral in the DCF, matters for yield and ROE.

Interest income makes up about 19% of pre-tax profit, and the FY25 audit opinion was qualified on three items

Two adjustments matter. First, BSCPLC earns a lot from cash: bank interest and other income was BDT 498mn in FY2025 and 537mn in the nine months to March 2026 [3 p.3], about a fifth of pre-tax profit. We value that cash at book in the bridge and strip its interest out of the P/E leg, so it is not counted twice. Second, the FY2026 Q4 profit implied by the DSE-announced EPS (BDT 641mn) is lower than Q3's 724mn; we show the difference of -83mn as a year-end adjustment until the audited statements explain it (provisions, tax true-up or WPPF are the usual causes).

The auditor (Aziz Halim Khair Choudhury, PKF) qualified the FY2025 opinion for: equity money of BDT 1,522mn not converted to shares under the FRC notification; an advance VAT balance of BDT 8.9mn that does not reconcile with a VAT return showing BDT 36.3mn payable; and BDT 124.1mn of VAT interest paid to the government and booked as a receivable from BTCL, with a further BDT 33.2mn disclosed as contingent [1 p.94]. We deduct half of the two VAT items (BDT 79mn) in the bridge; the amounts are small against equity of BDT 17bn.

We forecast diluted EPS of 13.45 in FY27F and 10.65 in FY28F, against FY26's 13.61, as private-cable price cuts and SMW-6 depreciation outrun volume growth

FY2026E agrees with the latest actuals: nine months to March 2026 from the un-audited statements, Q4 at the Q3 run-rate, and profit after tax equal to the DSE-announced EPS of 15.14 on 187.04mn shares (BDT 2,832mn). From FY2027 each line has its own driver. Bandwidth revenue is average utilised Gbps times price; co-location grows 8% a year (it rose 51% in the nine months as data centres used the landing stations); cost lines follow the drivers in the costs section; interest income is 9% on the opening cash and FDR balance (T-bills are 8.6-8.8% [7]); GoB loan interest is 2.3%; WPPF is 5% and tax 21%.

Revenue grows 4.0% in FY27F and -5.1% in FY28F, and 0.2% in FY31F: volume grows 15-18% a year in FY27-29 while price falls 10%, 20% and 15% as private cables start, then both settle near 10%. EPS is 13.45 in FY27F, 10.65 in FY28F (full-year SMW-6 depreciation) and 11.55 in FY31F. Against the company's own record: ROE was 22.6% in FY23 and about 12.5% in FY24-25 [1 p.15]; we forecast 14.0% in FY27F and 9.4% by FY31F, at the low end, because cash builds faster than profit. Return on operating capital is 10.0% in FY31F, inside its FY24-25 to FY23 range of 11-22%.

The payout path is an assumption: BSCPLC paid 30-41% of earnings in FY22-26, and the government, as 77% owner, takes most of any increase. A higher payout does not change the DCF value (the cash is counted either way) but would lift the yield.

What could make our forecast wrong in each line: bandwidth revenue (volume and price, see the grid), co-location (data-centre demand), O&M (SMW-6 maintenance charges are not yet disclosed; we assume about 1.2% of cost a year), provisions (IIG payment discipline), depreciation (SMW-6 useful life; we assume 25 years, and a shorter life would cut EPS), interest income (rates and how fast cash is spent) and tax (the listed-company rate).

Fair value range BDT 42–104; base 68 = 5.0x FY27F EPS and 2.9x EV/EBITDA, below the price of 142.5

We value BSCPLC with the three legs the F26 spec sets for it: a DCF that includes the SMW-6 cash flows (50%), a justified EV/EBITDA multiple (25%) and a justified P/E (25%). All three use the same forecast and the same cost of capital, so they are cross-checks rather than independent opinions. A sum of the parts does not apply: BSCPLC has no subsidiaries or associates, only a small share portfolio (BDT 27mn).

Cost of equity is 16.3%: the 10-year government bond yield of 9.268% [7] plus a Blume-adjusted beta of 0.93 (raw 0.90 on two years of weekly returns against DSEX [6]) times a 7.5% equity risk premium. BSCPLC has net cash and only concessional, project-tied GoB loans, so we use a 100% equity weight (F26 §G) and deduct the loans in the bridge. Terminal growth is 5% in taka, below nominal GDP because the price per Gbps keeps falling. Terminal reinvestment is g divided by a 12.5% return on new capital, BSCPLC's current regime: return on capital employed was 12.8% in FY24 and 12.4% in FY25 and ROE 12.5-12.7%, after ITCs took share [1 p.15]. We do not use the FY21-23 peak (22.7-25.5%) because the directors cite rising ITC share and three private submarine licences [1 p.43]. Over FY19-25 the return ranged 10.1-25.5% [1 p.15]. The same 12.5% is the sustainable ROE in the P/E leg and drives the EV/EBITDA multiple; the bear uses 10% (FY19) and the bull 15%. Because 12.5% is below the cost of equity, growth destroys a little value: +1pp of terminal g lowers fair value by about BDT 1.

The DCF gives an enterprise value of BDT 10.6bn at June 2026, 39% of it from the terminal value. Adding FDRs, T-bills and cash of BDT 7.9bn, deducting GoB loans of 4.5bn and half the VAT items gives equity of BDT 13.9bn, or BDT 70.2 a diluted share at 31-Oct-2026. The EV/EBITDA leg uses the multiple the same terminal assumptions justify (2.82x = FCFF/EBITDA conversion of 30% x (1+g)/(WACC−g)) on FY27F EBITDA, less the SMW-6 spend still to come: BDT 53.9. The P/E leg applies a justified 5.6x (payout 1 − g/ROE = 60%, (1+g)/(Ke−g)) to FY27F EPS excluding interest on surplus cash (10.89) and adds net cash: BDT 76.8.

Why the legs differ: the EV/EBITDA leg is lowest because it capitalises FY27F EBITDA as if steady state while deducting the full SMW-6 bill, whereas the DCF gives credit for the revenue growth SMW-6 enables in FY28-31. The P/E leg sits close to the DCF because both assume the same 12.5% return on new capital. We keep the 50/25/25 weights from the spec.

The bear and bull cases move the same drivers as the risk table and fade back to the base growth rates: volume growth ±5pp in FY27-28; price, where the bear takes the full private-cable shock of -45% in FY27 (Tk120 to about Tk65 per Mbps), then recovers partly (+10%, +5%, 0%) as the price war eases and demand fills the new cables, returning to the -10% trend in FY31, while the bull has private cables late (-5%, -6%, -6%); provisions ±1pp of revenue; SMW-6 remaining cost ±15% (a USD contract already re-priced once); and return on new capital 10% / 12.5% / 15%. The bear's fade is set so that FY31F return on operating capital is 9.9%, the FY19 floor of BSCPLC's FY19-25 range and equal to the bear's 10% return on new capital; the bull's 20.6% sits inside the range. A permanent cut (-45% in FY27, then -10% a year, with the other bear drivers) gives BDT 27 and FY31F ROCE of 2.5%, below anything in BSCPLC's history; we show it as a stress line outside the range, not as the bear case. The cost of equity is the same in all three.

Context, not pricing: the stock trades at 9.4x FY2026 basic EPS and 1.39x NAV. Its own trailing P/E median since FY2021 is 12.6x, set in years when the 10-year bond yielded well under today's 9.3%. The only other listed telecom-infrastructure names on DSE are the mobile operators: Grameenphone trades at 10.8x its 2025 EPS and 4.4x 2025 EV/EBITDA (our GP report), but it is a retail mobile operator with a near-100% payout, so it is not a valuation peer. No other listed company sells wholesale international bandwidth in Bangladesh, so we use no peer leg.

Reverse check: at 142.5 the market is paying 126 a share for the operating business against our 52. The most favourable cell of the grid (25% volume growth, prices -5% a year to FY31) gives BDT 116, so the price also implies a cost of equity several points below ours. Holding FY27F EPS flat, the price implies a P/E of 10.6x versus our justified 5.6x on operating earnings.

Implied multiples by scenario: the base value of BDT 68 implies 5.0x FY27F and 6.4x FY28F diluted EPS, 2.9x FY27F EV/EBITDA, 0.74x June 2026 book and a 6.5% FY27F dividend yield; the bear and bull columns of the scenario table show the same for each bound. On capacity, the base implies an enterprise value of about BDT 0.49mn per lit Gbps once SMW-6 is lit, low because most of the new capacity will be unused for years.

Losing the IIG sourcing rule (-35%) and a -45% private-cable price shock (-20%) are the largest risks; watch private-cable launch prices

Each risk below names the line it moves and is sized by a full re-run of the model with one driver changed. Price dominates: the bear and bull price paths move fair value from BDT 54 to 87; a 5pp swing in volume growth moves it by about BDT 6. Cost lines, tax and SMW-6 overruns move it by BDT 1-6. Because new capital earns 12.5%, below the 16.3% cost of equity, higher terminal growth slightly lowers value.

• Utilised Gbps and the IPLC/IP-transit split in the FY2026 annual report: volume above 4,700 Gbps at June 2027 would track our base; IP transit falling further would point to price pressure.
• Private submarine-cable launch prices: our base already assumes about -39% by FY29; Tk 60-70 per Mbps in 2027 is the bear case; prices staying there is the stress line.
• SMW-6 ready-for-service date and final cost: each 15% on the remaining spend is about BDT 2-3 a share.
• Conversion of the GoB equity money: the price agreed sets the real dilution (we assume 21mn shares).
• Interest rates: a 1pp fall in FDR yields cuts EPS by about BDT 0.3 but does not change the DCF.

Model update: this report uses the audited FY2025 annual report, the un-audited Q3 FY2026 statements (nine months to 31-Mar-2026) and the DSE-announced FY2026 results (EPS, NAV, NOCFPS, dividend; audited statements not yet filed). We will update the model when the FY2026 annual report is filed.

Data gaps, stated openly: the FY2026 audited statements and annual report (utilised Gbps at June 2026, receivables, SMW-6 progress) are not yet in our filings database; BSCPLC's market share is our division of two news figures; there is no earnings call or management guidance; the IRU/lease split of revenue and the BTRC revenue-share rate are not disclosed in what we read; USD/BDT was not taken from Bangladesh Bank for this report.

FAQ

What is Bangladesh Submarine Cables' fair value?

Our fair value range is BDT 42–104 a share with a base of 68, from a DCF including SMW-6, a justified EV/EBITDA and a justified P/E, against a price of BDT 142.5 on 29-Oct-2026.

How much did BSCPLC earn in FY2026?

The board reported basic EPS of BDT 15.14 (diluted 13.61) for the year to 30-Jun-2026, against 11.01 a year earlier, NAV per share of 102.39 and a 47.5% cash dividend (DSE announcement, 17-Oct-2026; audited statements not yet filed).

When will SEA-ME-WE 6 start?

The FY2025 annual report expected it to be ready for service in the last quarter of 2026; in September 2026 the company said 2027 (reported by TBS). We assume January 2027. It costs BDT 12.86bn and adds about 15 Tbps a direction.

Who competes with BSCPLC?

Six ITC operators that import bandwidth over land from India, and three private submarine-cable licensees expected to start within about a year of the FY2025 report. BSCPLC supplies roughly 30% of national bandwidth on news-reported figures.

Why is the fair value below the share price?

Because private cables are likely to cut bandwidth prices by about 40% by FY29, profit stays near FY2026's level until SMW-6 traffic builds, and our cost of equity is 16.3%. Even 25% volume growth a year with only a 5% price decline gives about BDT 116; the price also implies a lower cost of capital than ours.

Does the government own BSCPLC?

Yes, about 77%. It also holds BDT 1.52bn of equity money not yet converted to shares, which the auditor flagged in a qualified opinion.

Sources

1. Bangladesh Submarine Cables PLC Annual Report 2024-25 (year to 30-Jun-2025, audited, qualified opinion) · link · accessed 2026-10-31
2. Bangladesh Submarine Cable Company Ltd Annual Report 2020-21 (five-year summary FY2017-21) · link · accessed 2026-10-31
3. Bangladesh Submarine Cables PLC un-audited financial statements, nine months to 31-Mar-2026 (Q3 FY2026) · link · accessed 2026-10-31
4. Bangladesh Submarine Cable Company Ltd Annual Report 2022-23 (year to 30-Jun-2023, with FY2022 comparatives) · link · accessed 2026-10-31
5. DSE announcements for BSCPLC, Nov-2024 to Oct-2026 (FY2026 EPS, NAV, NOCFPS and 47.5% cash dividend of 17-Oct-2026; quarterly results; GoB share issue; credit rating; qualified opinion; MD appointment) · link · accessed 2026-10-31
6. AnalystBro market data: DSE:BSCPLC daily, weekly and monthly bars and DSEX weekly bars (chart_bars), 29/30-Oct-2026 · link · accessed 2026-10-31
7. Bangladesh Bank treasury auction cut-off yields (10-year BGTB 9.268%, 25-Oct-2026; 91-364 day T-bills 8.56-8.79%) · link · accessed 2026-10-31
8. The Business Standard, 'Bangladesh has no current or future bandwidth shortage: Submarine Cables', 3-Sep-2026 (company statement) · link · accessed 2026-10-31
9. The Financial Express, 'Affordable internet hinges on pvt investment in submarine cable mkt', 22-Sep-2026 (seminar) · link · accessed 2026-10-31
10. The Financial Express, 'Submarine Cable Company's internet prices to fall by 10pc' (Mar-2025 price cut) · link · accessed 2026-10-31
11. The Financial Express, 'BSCPLC offers special bonus on new bandwidth purchases' (incentives for IIGs sourcing over half from submarine cable) · link · accessed 2026-10-31
12. AnalystBro BSCPLC model (model.xlsx): forecasts, valuation, scenarios, risk runs, grids · link · accessed 2026-10-31